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 The Limits to Community-based Conflict Resolution in North-East Congo 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the site of one of the most egregious 
conflicts in modern times.  Fuelled by a violent political economy of mineral and natural 
resource extraction, the lengthy cycle of violence and intimidation has resulted in the highest 
death toll in any war since World War II.  The shortcomings of internationally sponsored 
peacebuilding efforts in the region have led to a local turn in the peacebuilding literature 
where a key role for community groups in local conflict resolution and development is being 
promoted.   
Drawing on fieldwork conducted by the author with community groups in Ituri District in 
north-eastern DRC, this article highlights the failure of international and national initiatives 
to address the underlying causes of the Iturian conflict and goes on to argue that there are 
limits to what local communities can achieve in this context. The findings demonstrate that 
the greatest impact of community groups’ activities is at individual rather than structural 
levels and three inter-related reasons are given for this.  The article concludes by highlighting 
four issues for community groups interested in challenging the status quo and effecting long-
lasting transformative change, moving from conflict containment to conflict transformation. 
  
3 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
The ‘Congo wars’ of the 1990s, and their aftermath are widely regarded as some of the most 
complex and egregious conflicts of our time.  Fuelled by a violent international political 
economy of extraction and exploitation, the wars have generated levels of suffering that are 
unparalleled in any recent war and have caused, directly and indirectly, the highest death toll 
of any conflict since World War II.   By 2007 an estimated 5.4 million people had died with 
an estimated one thousand innocent civilians dying every day (International Rescue 
Committee 2007) although these figures are disputed by some (see Lambert and Lohlé-Tart 
2008 in Trefon 2011: 60).  Millions more were displaced as they fled the violence, with an 
estimated three million people remaining internally displaced as of 2014 as violence and 
insecurity continues, in particular in the east of the country (UNHCR, 2014).  Sexual violence 
against women and children has been widespread and disease and malnutrition rampant (Baaz 
and Stern 2013).  A high level of regional and national instability has resulted, leading to 
widespread personal insecurity which persists to the present.   
 
Some of the bloodiest fighting and the gravest atrocities took place in the resource-rich 
district of Ituri in north-eastern DRC.  During the worst years of the conflict here, from 1999 
to 2003, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 people were killed and a further 500,000 were 
displaced (HRW, 2003; Amnesty International, 2003: 15) as local rebel groups and warlords 
joined forces with Ugandan and Rwandan actors and networks to gain control of the district’s 
mineral wealth.  While the fighting has since abated, the legacies of the war continue and low 
lying insecurity (banditry and looting) remains a feature of daily life in many areas with more 
widespread violence resurging in the district capital Bunia in 2012 (author interviews Bunia; 
see also OCHA, 2014).   
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The United Nations’ (UN’s) peacekeeping mission in the DRC, now, at $8.7 billion, the 
largest and most expensive operation in the UN’s history, has been widely criticised as an 
expensive (in terms of local lives and livelihoods as well as investment) failure (Englebert 
and Tull 2008; Eriksen 2009; Trefon 2013).  The reason for this is its emphasis on regional 
stability and its neglect of local tensions and animosities.    As Autesserre, in her detailed, 
comprehensive and compelling analysis of the UN’s mission in the DRC notes (2010: 95), 
‘the main reason that the peace-building strategy in Congo has failed is that the international 
community has paid too little attention to the root causes of violence there: local disputes 
over land and power’.  She, together with a range of other commentators (Kisangani 2006, 
2010; Engelbert and Tull 2008; Trefon 2011; Larmer et al 2013), has called for greater 
support to more locally rooted, community-based peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
These locally rooted, community-based initiatives are the focus of this article.  Drawing on 
fieldwork conducted by myself among seven diverse communities in Ituri in August, 2014, I 
highlight a number of challenges facing local groups in their attempts to assist their 
communities and to manage local conflicts.  Fieldwork included interviews with development 
agency (local and international) representatives in the district capital Bunia, together with 
interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with community group members, non-group 
members and local political authorities across seven different sites within the district.  The 
seven sites were both ethnically and geographically (urban/rural and in terms of resource 
wealth) diverse. In total, interviews were held with seven agency representatives at district 
level and, in the sites visited, with 13 local authorities (including 2 women); 88 members of 
local community groups in focus group discussions (65 women and 23 men); 17 members of 
local community groups in individual interviews (13 women and 4 men); and 22 randomly 
selected community members (11 women and 11 men).  All interviews and FGDs were 
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carried out by myself, with translation from local languages to French provided by local 
translators.  Back in Ireland, I transcribed and translated (from French to English) all 
interviews and FGDs in full.  Within the article, I go on to discuss four key issues for 
community groups and their supporters interested in moving from a more survivalist to a 
more transformative role – i.e. from conflict containment to conflict transformation, 
challenging the exploitative and, at times, divisive social norms and structural inequalities 
underpinning local tensions and animosities.  The article, although primarily aimed at those 
supporting local community mobilisation and peacebuilding initiatives, is also relevant to 
broader contemporary debates on community resilience where the emphasis on local agency 
tends to ignore the broader structural constraints and limitations to its exercise (see for 
example Chandler, 2012; World Bank 2013; and UNDP 2014). 
 
Conflict minerals and war in Ituri  
Taking its name from the Ituri river, Ituri is one of five districts of Orientale Province in the 
north-east of the DRC and shares a border with both Uganda and Sudan.  It is richly endowed 
with highly fertile land, pristine forests, large gold deposits, both fish and oil reserves in Lake 
Albert and also deposits of diamonds and coltan (Pottier, 2003; IKV Pax Christi and RHA, 
2012; Fahey, 2013).   Ituri has a surface area of approximately 65,000 km² and a population 
of over four million.  There are ten principle ethnic groups, with the Alur (27%) mainly 
concentrated in Mahagi; whereas the Lendu (24%) and Hema (18%) are in the territories of 
Djugu and Irumu (the two territories included in this study); and the Lugbara (12%) are 
concentrated in the Aru territory (IKV Pax Christi and RHA, 2012: 9).   
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Although conflict has waged in Eastern Congo since 1996, Ituri was the scene of some of the 
bloodiest fighting and gravest atrocities in the DRC between the years 1999-2003.  Some 
dozen non-state armed forces emerged during this time.  Many of these were organised along 
ethnic lines and, exploiting local tensions and animosities, incited significant sections of the 
local population to violence (UNSC, 2002; Anten, 2010).  While the most intense period of 
conflict was from 1999-2007, violence resurged in Bunia in 2012 and violence and unrest 
continue in South Irumu territory at the time of writing (see also OCHA, 2014).     
 
Conflict in Ituri, while closely linked to ethnic-based conflict in the neighbouring provinces 
of North and South Kivu, is also rooted in a history of mineral and natural resource 
exploitation.  For over 150 years foreign military and commercial interventions in the area 
have aggravated local rivalries and tensions, politicising ethnic relations and increasing the 
likelihood of grievance-based conflict.  As Fahey (2013) notes, the decisions by local leaders 
to either collaborate or to resist incursions into Ituri – initially for ivory and slaves, and later 
for gold and land – has had a profound impact on local relations within the district.   
 
The two principal internal drivers of the recent Iturian war were unequal access to land (and 
its resources) and a high level of social stratification which, through multiple deeply 
entrenched regional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies of superiority and inferiority, fuelled 
tensions and grievances as well as egregious acts of sexual violence during the war.  Land 
conflicts have existed since the colonial era when Belgian agents appointed local Chiefs, re-
drew boundaries and physically separated populations (Hochschild, 2008; Fahey, 2013).  
Following independence, disputes over land rights, access and ownership became 
incorporated into local struggles for political and economic power – notably between the 
pastoralist Hema and the agriculturalist Lendu ethnic groups (Pottier, 2003; Vlassenroot and 
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Raeymaekers, 2004; RCN, 2009; Huggins 2012).  These struggles have been fuelled by a vast 
mineral wealth, comprising mostly gold, timber and oil, with local elites colluding with 
national and international (predominantly Ugandan and Rwandan in the first instance and on 
through complex supply chains into Europe and the US) actors in extracting the benefits of 
this wealth to the exclusion of the majority of the Iturian population (Anten, 2010; Fahey, 
2013).   Yet, as the following section demonstrates, international and national responses to 
the war – both peacekeeping efforts and efforts to regulate mining – have neglected 
community concerns and sources of local tension. 
 
International and national responses to Ituri’s war 
In 2003, at the height of the Ituri war, an EU-led military intervention was launched into the 
district capital, Bunia.  The initial three month operation, named Artemis, paved the way for 
the subsequent UN Mission in the Congo named MONUC (later, with a broader stabilisation 
mandate, re-named MONUSCO).  Over the coming years this international intervention 
succeeded in bringing a degree of stability to the region as it neutralised rebel forces.  
However, its abject failure to protect civilians from direct attacks in towns and villages across 
the district has been strongly criticised (Clark, 2011; Copeland, 2012).  Moreover, the 
accompanying process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconstruction (DDR) aimed at 
disarming and reintegrating rebels was disorganised and ultimately largely ineffective as it 
became mired in institutional turf wars and corruption scandals (Bouta, 2005; Veit, 2010; 
author interviews with local implementing agencies, 2014).  As one local NGO representative 
notes, ‘It [DDR] was carried out as an emergency programme. And the problem started 
there.  A systematic analysis was not done, and that is why it has failed. They did train people 
[ex-combatants], they gave them a little bit of equipment, technical materials.  But there is 
very little need in the village for that [equipment and material provided].  So there was a 
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certain level of in-adaptation in the service that was given to the demobilised, that’s from one 
side. On the other side, gross amounts of money were injected, but were mal-managed.’  
Another local NGO representative is even more direct on the issue of resources.  ‘The sum 
that we were given for the reinsertion of the ex-combatants, only four per cent of the money 
went to the population and the rest was in their [funding and implementing agencies’] 
pocket… There is a system established between certain agents of the funding structures 
[funding agencies] with the executors [implementing agencies] of the [DDR] projects.  They 
call it ‘Operation Retour’ [Return Operation].  They give you money and you return ten per 
cent, fifteen per cent or twenty per cent to the person [funding agency representative].  But 
they don’t do any work to justify it, it is pure theft.’ 
 
Perhaps most significantly however is the fact that international efforts aimed at stabilising 
the region have failed to address in any way the local drivers of conflict including those 
arising from ongoing illegal mineral and natural resource appropriation by networks of local, 
national and international actors (Anten, 2010; Autesserre, 2010; Tamm, 2013b; Hellmueller, 
2014). As the RCN (2009: 9) puts it, Ituri today is ‘a zone of neither war nor peace’ with the 
exploitation and expropriation of the district’s natural resources by new networks of internal 
and external ‘resource entrepreneurs’ (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004: 385) continuing 
apace.  The continued failure to address the ambiguous and easily manipulated land tenure 
laws leaves a legal vacuum whereby powerful vested interests override the rights of ordinary 
Iturians seeking to sustain a livelihood for their families (author interviews NGO 
representatives and focus group discussions, 2014; see also RCN, 2009).  The illegal timber 
harvesting in the forests of Mambasa (author interview and correspondence RCN, 2014); the 
insecurity around the gold mines towards which former militias are increasingly gravitating 
(companies are reported to include the British companies Kibali Gold Mines, Ashanti Gold 
9 | P a g e  
 
Kilo (AGK), Auris Gold and Kilo Gold; the British and South African company, Muana 
Africa; and the Canadian company Loncor - author interviews Kilo and RCN, 2014; see also 
IKV/RHA, 2012), and local tensions around the secret oil deals reportedly signed between 
Kinshasa and a range of international oil companies for prospecting rights in Lake Albert 
(companies are reported to include Heritage Oil, Tullow Oil, Total, Divine Inspiration 
Consortium, H-Oil Sud, Congo Petroleum and Gas, Caprikat and Foxwhelp (Pottier, 2003; 
Cafod and Trocaire, 2012; author interviews RHA and RCN)) all serve to fuel local 
grievances as communities witness ongoing external appropriation of their wealth.   
 
A World Bank sponsored Mining Code was introduced by the national government in 2002.  
This aimed at formalising the mining sector and turning it into one of the principle drivers of 
the country’s economy.  However, in common with similar reform programmes throughout 
the sub-continent (see Pegg, 2003; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Campbell, 2011), it neglects 
the concerns and interests of local communities. Moreover Trefon (2013, 41-42), drawing on 
the findings of a review of 61 mining deals within the DRC between the years 2006 and 
2009, concludes that the government has not increased its transparency in this area and that 
secret negotiations remain the norm.  This has certainly been the experience in Ituri where 
local activists, working with local community groups, have failed – despite robust efforts – to 
secure information on oil mining companies operating locally.  Both local communities and 
provincial authorities have been side-lined in deals negotiated directly with government 
authorities in Kinshasa.  As one local NGO representative notes, ‘here all we saw was 
companies arriving with military personnel, with jeeps, with their arms.  We saw these 
companies but we did not know who they were’.   
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While communities in other countries are often afforded some space to voice their grievances 
and demands in the context of the activities of mining and extractive industries in their 
communities (see for example, Kemp, 2010; Ackah-Baido, 2013; Machonaschie and Hilson, 
2013), in Ituri the activities of such companies remain clandestine and hidden (author 
interviews with community groups, RCN and RHA, 2014).  Even where local people have 
managed to uncover who some of the companies are and where they are based locally, it has 
proven impossible to secure a meeting to gather any further information on their activities.  A 
local NGO representative outlines the problem, ‘Because the company in Block One and 
Two, it is a company that is very in flux [constantly moving].  It is very hard to know who is 
responsible.  They opened an office here even.  But if you go to the office you will find a 
Guard, but there are no people inside.  And each time we called them to try to have a 
meeting, we got no response’. 
 
With EU and UN responses to the war aimed at regional stability through elite political 
settlements and therefore failing to address and, in some cases, exacerbating local tensions, 
attention among commentators and practitioners alike is now turning to local community 
capacity to manage these tensions.  The remainder of this article draws on research in seven 
diverse communities examining their experiences and challenges in attempting to do so.   
 
 
Community responses 
One of the consequences of the Iturian war, in common with many other post-conflict 
contexts, was the emergence of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supported by 
an influx of international humanitarian agencies.  These local NGOs sought to work through 
pre-existing community structures, establishing their own local structures where necessary.  
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Necessarily, their immediate aim was to assist families and communities to survive through 
the horrors of the war and its aftermath – the two main activities were conflict management 
between local ethnic groups (‘pacification’) and, for women’s groups, assisting victims of 
sexual violence to seek medical attention and psychological support.  Groups studied for this 
research range from those established at this time to those established more recently.  These 
include women’s groups, mixed male-female groups and groups with mixed ethnic make-ups.  
Yet, despite these differences in evolution and constituency, the main impacts of all groups 
remain very much at individual levels – addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of 
local conflicts and development challenges.  The principle activities today are local conflict 
management and assistance to victims of sexual violence, as well as local development and 
community sensitisation on a number of issues - including women’s rights. 
 
In this regard, group members have provided valuable assistance to select friends, family 
members and neighbours, as well as benefitting from membership themselves.  For example, 
as the excerpt from a female group member below demonstrates, the training in women’s 
rights provided to the group by the supporting NGO facilitated her in defending her own 
rights against a customary forced marriage following the death of her husband. 
I am a widow. After the death of my husband, following the custom, they [husband’s 
family] had prepared a brother of my [late] husband who was now to be my husband. 
But thanks to the training, on the rights of the widow, I defended myself in front of the 
family who wanted to give me a husband by force and I defended my own rights and 
those of my children. 
(Female FGD participant, Site A) 
 
Other group members use such training to try to assist other women ‘victims’ of sexual 
violence in their village. 
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There are men who refuse to live with women who have been victims of sexual 
violence. Even though they have followed their [medical] treatment. So we have 
identified these men and we would like to invite these men and to speak to them so 
that they will not abandon their women.  It is not these women who wanted to be 
victims but it is just the consequence of war.  
     (Individual interview, Female group member, Site D) 
 
 
While there have been attempts to address broader structural issues, these have involved 
approaches to local individuals rather than addressing their broader structural causes of the 
problem.  For example, one of the greatest economic difficulties for families is managing to 
pay local school ‘fees’ (The lack of state investment in education, as in all other social 
sectors, means that teachers’ salaries remain extremely low and sporadic and there is no 
public infrastructural expenditure.  Education has consequently been, de facto, privatised.  In 
the sites visited, primary school ‘fees’ are approximately $3/month; secondary school fees 
approximately $6/month; and university fees approximately $450 per annum).  Yet, although 
the root of the problem is complex and multilayered, the local group’s solution is to try to 
negotiate with the local school authorities rather building support to demand redress further 
up the line. 
Me: And for the payment for education, do you think it is something that you could 
influence? Could the group do something about this? 
Yes, [group E] could involve itself.  Because we are participants of governance.  We 
should talk to the managers of the school to debate the issue.  Lately here, there is no 
money in the hands of the population.  Each day that the cost of living goes up, to 
have money is very difficult.  So [group E] could involve itself in the negotiation of the 
payment of education.  Because there is no money, because soon there will be very 
few children in school. 
    (Individual interview, male group member, Site E) 
 
A similar approach is seen with another group attempting to tackle the (illegal) issue of road 
‘taxes’ imposed by the armed military who continue to be deployed in the area due to 
ongoing low levels of insecurity.  Rather than mobilising public support against this 
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continued exploitation of the population, the strategy is to tackle the issue through individual 
channels, with the problem identified being the multiplicity of such blockades rather than 
their existence per se. 
Another thing that we try to change were the blockades set up by the military on the 
roads. We tried everything to change these but that has not worked. 
Me: And what did you do to try to change this? 
We did a lot of lobbying to the Commander of the military but that didn’t work…. We 
pay that [the fee imposed for passage at the road blocks] from fear because they can 
also shoot you if you do not pay.  The biggest problem is there is a multiplicity of these 
blockades. So if you are going a long distance you are obliged to pay the Fr.500 per 
blockade and it becomes very expensive. 
      (Female FGD participant, Site A) 
 
These findings, which point to important impacts at individual levels but little in the way of 
broader structural and political impacts addressing the ongoing legacies and causes of local 
conflicts, beg the question as to why this is so.  Drawing again from fieldwork, three inter-
related factors are proposed which help explain the limited broader transformative impact of 
community groups’ actions.  These are the relations of groups with their local political 
authorities; their framing of local issues and difficulties; and their relations with their broader 
communities.   
 
Relations with local authorities: Consolidating rather than contesting unequal relations 
As we have previously seen, the local drivers of conflict – unequal access to land and 
resources fuelled by networks of local, national and international actors – remain.  Embedded 
to varying degrees within these networks, local authorities remain unwilling or unable to 
challenge these and the exploitation and marginalisation of local communities continues 
apace.  Yet, both community group members and local authorities identify their roles as 
working in collaboration with rather than in opposition to each other, surviving within rather 
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than transforming an inherently unjust and dislocating system.  Some excerpts from 
interviews and focus group discussions illustrate this approach.   
 
Our role is to see the evolution of the village and, if there is a problem, then we will 
involve the Chief of the area directly…  Before we did not work with the Chief.  But 
now we work with Chief.  So now if we want to construct a house, we do this with the 
Chief. 
(Female FGD participant, Site E) 
 
We come to give him [Village Chief] a report on how we have managed the conflicts 
if he is not present. 
      (Female FGD participant, Site A) 
 
We count on sensitising the population on how the population can pay the state tax, 
this is already planned, and we have discussed this with the local authority so he will 
allow this. And also, another theme [for our sensitisation] is that the population 
supports the plan of development put forward by the Chief – the construction of 
bridges, the construction of schools, where the community can contribute to bringing 
the something for the construction, that is what we have planned.   
      (Male FGD participants Site G) 
 
These women [the local women’s community group] do sensitisation in the village.  
They organise meetings with women and with the women Chiefs [village women 
nominated by the village Chief to work on his behalf] in each village.  They sensitise 
them on cleanliness, on how they should comport themselves, on how they should 
maintain their village and their field.  They sensitise for sanitation… If there are 
problems with women, if these problems are brought to the village Chief he calls the 
woman Chief to deal with these problems with the women. 
(Interview village chief, Site F) 
 
Moreover, one of the key benefits of community group membership identified by members is 
the enhanced status and prestige accrued from these closer relations to authorities.   
The advantage of being a member is that we are closer to the power… As a member 
of [group G], I am given an honour on the road [I am respected], the military people, 
the police.  I am known as a member of this association. 
      (Male FGD participant, Site G) 
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What impresses me the most is the relationship with the authorities.  At the start I was 
afraid of these people.  But when I am at the head of the group, in meetings for 
example, I speak.  People know me. And even people when they meet me on the road, 
they say ‘E [name of group] how are you?’.  I am very proud of that.  
    
(Individual interview, Female group member, Site E) 
 
Operating in collaboration with local authorities, the role of community groups therefore 
appears to be to reconcile people to their world, rather than to contest and transform it.  Their 
actions as what we might perceive as parallel authorities in this regard, risk reproducing and 
consolidating existing inequalities and hierarchies of authority, knowledge and power, 
thereby supporting rather than challenging and transforming these political institutions and 
the broader networks in which they are embedded.  As we now see below, this is reinforced 
by a framing of local challenges and difficulties which emphasises personal responsibility 
over political factors.   
 
Framing local problems: Collective rights through personal responsibility  
Although not necessarily a conscious strategy employed by groups, local problems are 
framed in two principle ways by groups.  Significantly, these focus on how to address 
problems (prognostic) rather than exploring their causes (diagnostic).  The frames employed 
employ both a legal discourse and a discourse of personal responsibility.   
 
The legal frame is very common and appears extremely effective – most particularly in 
relation to both the issues of women’s rights and in relation to raising debate on the issue of 
gender-based violence (GBV).  Drawing from the explicit rights-based approach employed 
by many NGOs, it focuses on provisions within the Constitution, and training on this has 
been provided by supporting NGOs to community group members.  In a context where the 
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law appears to have some influence on norms and behaviours at local levels (if not at 
provincial or national), group members have made much use of this framing in shaping 
attitudes and behaviours.  The following excerpts provide a little more detail on how this is 
done. 
Before 2008 [when the group was established and trained] men did not listen to 
women.  They did not consider them.  But after 2008, with the installation of our 
group by the RHA and the training of FOMI[NGOs], people are now more convinced.  
What has convinced them the most is what is in the Constitution.  So that is what 
convinces them.  Even if they are not happy with this [talk of women’s rights], they do 
listen to us. 
      (Individual interview, group member, Site E) 
 
 
Before the custom did not allow us women to sit with men but now, after the 
Constitution openly authorised this, we take our responsibility and we sensitise other 
women so that they will work with men. 
(Female participant FGD, Site C) 
 
 
The second frame employed is people’s own responsibility, in particular in relation to local 
development, but also in relation to women’s parity and GBV.  A male advisor to the 
women’s group in Site C frames the group’s role in this light.  
Me: What is the role of your group? 
As I understand it, it is to bring up the women who are in the home.  These women are 
chosen to develop themselves.  They go everywhere in the villages to sensitise other 
women, to give them advice and pressure them on what they cannot do themselves. So 
they help them to develop themselves - on sanitation for example.  They do all the 
development of the village.  Together with the Chief, they are there for the 
development of the village.  
(Male FGD participant (advisor to women’s group), Site C – emphasis added) 
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While the rights-based approach with its strong legislative basis proves an extremely 
powerful frame within the community, the emphasis on personal responsibility leaves no 
scope to explore or interrogate the responsibilities of state structures and authorities or their 
broader international networks.  This is also evident in the reinforcement of gender-based 
hierarchies of knowledge and authority, and in the persistent framing of gender inequalities in 
personal rather than structural terms.  As the excerpt from a male advisor to the women’s 
group in Site D outlines, difficulties are women’s own and the responsibility for addressing 
them are also women’s own.  Notwithstanding this, the advisors (as the appellation suggests) 
appear to have superior knowledge to women on how to do this. 
We support the women to reinforce their capacity around the different trainings that 
we have received from FOMI.  We are here to hold sensitisations.  The essential thing 
for the women is that they come out of obscurity ….I am interested in accompanying 
the women because they have a lot of information to impart - all their difficulties.  We 
can also show them an orientation, to show them – ‘how will you do to address your 
issues?’ [how to address your issues].   
  (Male FGD participant (advisor to women’s group), Site D – emphasis added) 
 
 
Solutions to systemic problems are promoted within a political and cultural vacuum.  As 
such, they tend to address symptoms rather than causes.  At best, such solutions can lead to 
some temporary respite for some but, at worst – notably in relation to the framing of 
women’s rights as being women’s sole responsibility – they can add to the already significant 
demands (physical and psychological) on individuals’ and families’ energy and resources.  In 
addition, with the responsibilities and agency of political authorities rendered all but invisible 
and the same problems and conflicts doomed to repeat themselves, people’s tendency to vent 
frustration and anger at the ethnic / gendered / regional ‘other’ is exacerbated.   
 
Relations with local communities: Talking ‘at’ rather than ‘with’ and failing to mobilise 
networks of solidarity, support and change 
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A third factor contributing to the non-transformationalist nature of community group 
engagement is the nature of community groups’ relationships with other community 
members.  The focus is on information provision and sensitisation rather than mediation and 
mobilisation (talking at rather than listening to).  As the excerpt below illustrates, aimed at 
individual and collective behavioural change, this is intertwined with the framing of issues in 
terms of personal responsibility.  The excerpt refers to a common problem in all sites – that of 
‘the night market’ / ‘la marché nocturne’.  Although framed in terms of personal 
responsibility for going to the market before dark, the problem is actually one of sexual 
assault and rape – the incidence of which increases after dark.  The consequences of this 
framing are apparent from the response of one group who, when asked if men should also be 
sensitised on this issue, after a pause responded that yes, men can also, in rare cases, be 
subject to assault. 
What we do the most regularly with the community are sensitisations.  We sensitise 
people to discourage them from going to the market at night because here people 
have the habit of going to the market late1. 
We also did sensitisation in three villages on how to avoid it catching the illness 
HIV/AIDS 
Me: when you do sensitisations, why do you do sensitisations? What is the aim of 
this? 
To change the mentality, to wake the population. 
     (Participants in FGD Site A– emphasis added) 
 
 
This almost exclusive and ubiquitous focus on sensitisation leaves little scope to explore 
perceptions, experiences and analyses of community members, to formulate strategies around 
these, and to work together to address them.  In short, it misses valuable opportunities to 
explore and imagine alternative futures and to build coalitions of support for these.   
                                                          
1  
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Overall, the findings presented in this section demonstrate that local community groups’ 
activities to date are aimed at surviving within rather than transforming the extractive, 
exploitative system which underpinned the war and which continues today.  Community 
mobilisation in this context aims at reconciling communities to this system rather than 
building coalitions of solidarity and support to challenge and transform it.  In this context, 
there are significant limits to what communities can achieve and the international 
community’s excessive reliance on community-based conflict resolution whilst not tackling 
the broader structural causes of this conflict appears unrealistic and misplaced.    
 
Conclusion 
The Ituri war was a war of greed and grievance.  Fuelled by networks of local, national and 
international actors, it was underpinned by an inherently unequal and unjust socio-political 
system.  This system remains.  And so, the underlying drivers of conflict remain.  Life, for 
the majority of Ituri’s citizens struggling to rebuild their homes, lives and livelihoods 
following the devastation of the war, remains difficult, insecure and precarious. 
 
While the admirable achievements of the community groups examined deserves due 
recognition, operating as they do in extremely difficult and challenging circumstances and 
rendering important and, in some cases, life-saving services to friends and neighbours, their 
transformative potential also merits further reflection.  In a context where the existing 
political system is clearly failing its people and where a new politics is required, community 
groups such as these can function as political laboratories where members can develop and 
consolidate their skills in argument formulation, debate, mediation, negotiation and 
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bargaining – skills, in other words, to equip them to contest local structures and to engage 
with wider political interest groups in forging a new, more inclusive and democratic politics.  
Drawing on such a vision, four issues which draw from the findings reported above are 
pertinent. 
 
First, in terms of framing, how can the framing of issues/problems/conflicts be broadened 
from prognosis alone (how to manage) to a diagnosis of their root causes?  Second, in terms 
of responsibilities, how can the field be broadened from individuals’ responsibilities to those 
of economic and political structures and authorities?  Third, in terms of women’s rights, how 
can the approach be broadened from the apolitical ‘add women and stir’ approach of the 
1980s to one which interrogates the root causes of women’s marginalisation and 
discrimination in the context of roles and hierarchies inscribed in and reproduced by 
dominant social norms, practices and discourses?  And fourth, in terms of community 
mobilisation, how can groups move from sensitisation alone to collaboration with community 
members and individuals to build networks of solidarity and support in challenging and 
transforming inherently inequitable systems and structures? 
 
The evidence of the past ten years demonstrates that greater equality, justice and freedom for 
Iturians will not come from the top down.  It has to be forged from the bottom up.  And, in a 
context where this has never been allowed or facilitated, this requires both space to imagine 
political alternatives and it requires coalitions of solidarity and support to bring them about.  
The challenges in developing such spaces and coalitions are certainly significant, but in a 
context where the root causes of the war remain simmering beneath the surface, the costs in 
not doing so are most certainly more.   
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